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1. Introduction
The belief that intangible assets have become key
drivers of economic performance has prompted a
growing number of firms to emphasise intangible
asset measures for internal decision-making and
control purposes. At the same time, an increasing
number of measurement frameworks such as the
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996),
Performance Prism (Neely et al., 2002), and
Intangible Assets Monitor (Sveiby, 1997), among
many others, have been developed by academics
and consultants to guide these measurement ef-
forts. A key question is whether greater measure-
ment of intangible assets for management
purposes actually improves economic perform-
ance, and whether any performance benefits are
contingent on the firm’s organisational environ-
ment and specific measurement practices.
This paper provides a broad overview of statisti-
cal evidence on the links between the internal
measurement of intangible assets (typically using
non-financial indicators) and economic perform-
ance, with particular emphasis on studies examin-
ing actual economic results rather than survey
respondents’ self-assessments of measurement
system satisfaction or organisational performance.
This evidence takes two general forms: (1) large-
sample, cross-sectional studies investigating
whether firms making greater use of intangible
asset measures for decision-making or compensa-
tion purposes are associated with higher account-
ing performance and stock returns; and (2)
quasi-experimental, company-level analyses ex-
amining whether accounting performance im-
proved after the adoption of measurement systems
with greater emphasis on intangible assets.
Consistent with Franco and Bourne’s (2004) re-
view of the performance measurement literature,
the evidence indicates that the strength of the sta-
tistical relations between intangible asset measure-
ment and organisational performance declines as
the sophistication of the analysis increases. The
majority of cross-sectional studies support the hy-
pothesis that greater use of intangible asset meas-
ures for internal purposes is positively associated
with organisational performance, with stronger re-
sults using self-reported performance rather than
actual accounting or stock market returns. These
studies also suggest that the performance benefits
from intangible asset measurement are contingent
on the extent to which the measures and their 
relative importance are appropriate for the organi-
sation’s chosen strategy, value drivers, and 
competitive environment. Quasi-experimental
analyses of performance effects in individual com-
panies, on the other hand, provide mixed evidence
on the benefits from intangible asset measurement,
with some finding positive relations and some
finding no relation between intangible asset meas-
urement and economic performance.
The mixed evidence in company-specific, quasi-
experimental studies is consistent with research in-
dicating that many individual firms find it difficult
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 38. No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. pp. 261-272 261
Does measuring intangibles for management
purposes improve performance? A review
of the evidence
Christopher D. Ittner*
Abstract—Despite the development of dozens of frameworks and techniques for measuring intangible assets, an
open question is whether the internal measurement of intangible assets for management purposes is associated with
higher economic performance. This paper provides an overview of the statistical evidence on the performance con-
sequences of intangible asset measurement. Although the bulk of these studies provide at least some evidence that
intangible asset measurement is associated with higher performance, many are limited by over-reliance on percep-
tual satisfaction or outcome variables, inadequate controls for contingency factors, simple variables for capturing
complex measurement practices, and the lack of data on implementation practices. I conclude by offering sugges-
tions for improving and extending studies on the performance consequences of intangible asset measurement.
Key words: intangible assets; intellectual capital; non-financial performance measures; balanced scorecard; per-
formance evaluation.
*The author is an Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting
at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. E-mail:
ittner@wharton.upenn.edu.
He thanks Marshall Vance for his research assistance. The
financial support of Ernst & Young, the ICAEW, and The









































to link improvements in their intangible asset
measures to financial gains (e.g. Ittner and
Larcker, 2003, 2005). Research suggests that these
difficulties may have more to do with implementa-
tion problems than with the lack of benefits from
intangible asset measurement. Studies find that
technical and organisational barriers prevent many
firms from identifying appropriate measures or as-
sessing the economic benefits from intangible
asset measurement. I therefore review the factors
found to hinder the ability of firms to achieve or
assess the economic benefits from improvements
in intangible asset measures.
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. The next section provides a brief discussion
of the reasons for measuring intangible assets, fol-
lowed by a review of studies on the economic ben-
efits from the internal measurement of these
assets. As part of this review, I examine studies on
the influence of ‘causal business models’ or ‘strat-
egy maps’ on the benefits from intangible asset
measurement. A growing number of commentators
argue that causal models or strategy maps are crit-
ical components of effective performance meas-
urement systems (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 2004;
Ittner and Larcker, 2003; Marr et al., 2004). I then
review studies on the technical and organisational
barriers that can prevent firms from achieving eco-
nomic benefits from intangible asset measurement.
The final section offers my conclusions and some
suggestions for future research.
2. The internal measurement of intangible
assets
Intangible assets represent expenditures on and de-
velopment of non-physical assets that are drivers
of future economic performance and firm value.
Andriessen’s (2004a) review of the performance
measurement literature identifies seven primary
reasons for internal measurement of intangible as-
sets: (1) focusing attention (‘what gets measured
gets managed’); (2) improving the management of
intangible resources; (3) creating resource-based
strategies; (4) monitoring effects from actions; (5)
translating business strategy into action; (6) weigh-
ing possible courses of action; and (7) enhancing
the management of the business as a whole.
A wide variety of techniques have been devel-
oped to measure intangible assets and achieve
these objectives. Andriessen (2004b), for example,
identifies more than 30 related measurement tech-
niques in the performance measurement literature,
divided into those focused on the financial valua-
tion of intangible assets and those focused on 
non-financial indicators of intangible asset devel-
opment.
Despite surveys finding widespread internation-
al adoption of various intangible asset measure-
ment techniques, research on the benefits of these
techniques is limited. The majority of published
papers are normative and provide little or no evi-
dence on the benefits of these techniques. Much of
the limited research on performance effects is con-
ducted by consulting firms and/or is based on sur-
vey respondents’ perceptions of the benefits their
organisations have received from intangible asset
measurement. As a result, the intangible asset
measurement literature has been criticised for
being overly focused on developing new tech-
niques rather than on assessing the techniques’ im-
pact. Given this criticism, I attempt to synthesise
the results from existing performance tests, to
identify limitations in this research, and to offer
suggestions for future research.
3. Studies on the economic benefits from
intangible asset measurement
3.1. Cross-sectional studies using perceived 
performance outcomes
One method for assessing the performance ef-
fects from intangible asset measurement is con-
ducting a cross-sectional study that examines
whether firms making greater or more appropriate
use of intangible asset measures or measurement
techniques such as the Balanced Scorecard
achieve higher performance. A key research design
issue is deciding how to evaluate the importance
placed on intangible asset measures (Ittner et al.,
2003). One approach is to assess the diversity in
the types of performance measures used by the or-
ganisation, under the assumption that greater
measurement diversity ensures that important in-
formation on the wide variety of intangible assets
that are present in most companies is not ignored.
A second approach examines the weight placed
on traditional financial measures relative to the
weight on non-traditional measures in areas such
as customers, employees, innovation, and quality.
The assumption underlying this approach is that
over-reliance on traditional financial measures
leads firms to become myopic and to under-em-
phasise development of critical intangible assets.
A more sophisticated approach attempts to as-
sess the ‘match’ or ‘fit’ between the firm’s sources
of competitive advantage and its reliance on intan-
gible asset measures. Following agency and con-
tingency theories on the choice of performance
measures (e.g. Brickley et al., 1997; Fisher, 1995),
this approach assumes that intangible asset meas-
ures are not equally beneficial in all settings, and
that the emphasis placed on these measures should
vary with the importance of intangible assets to
firm success.
A final approach examines whether specific
measurement techniques, particularly the Balanced
Scorecard, are associated with higher perform-
ance. In this approach, researchers assess either the









































extent to which survey respondents claim to use
measures related to the four Balanced Scorecard
perspectives (even though Kaplan and Norton
(1996) state that a Balanced Scorecard consists of
more than measurement in these four perspec-
tives), or the extent to which respondents claim to
use a Balanced Scorecard (based on a simple
yes/no response or a scale such as ‘not at all’ to
‘extensive use’), with little attention paid to the
particular measures or methods (such as the devel-
opment of ‘strategy maps’) used when implement-
ing the technique.
A second major research design issue is whether
performance outcomes are assessed using man-
agers’ perceptions of measurement system or 
organisational success, or using actual economic
results. Most studies using perceptual outcomes
find significant positive associations between self-
reported intangible asset measurement and per-
ceived performance. For example, Lingle and
Schiemann (1996) report that firms claiming to
make regular use of a diverse set of measures and
having management agreement over strategic suc-
cess factors achieve statistically higher self-report-
ed industry standing, financial performance
relative to competitors, and progress in managing
change efforts. Likewise, Hoque and James (2000)
find a significant positive association between per-
ceived organisational performance and the use of a
diverse set of measures related to the four
Balanced Scorecard categories. Hall (2008), in
turn, analyses the factors mediating the relation
between comprehensive performance measure-
ment systems and managers’ self-reports of their
own performance (rather than that of their organi-
sations), and concludes that the effect of compre-
hensive measurement systems on a manager’s
rating of his or her performance arises from in-
creased role clarity and psychological empower-
ment.
Similarly, studies on the Balanced Scorecard fre-
quently examine whether scorecard systems are
related to measurement system satisfaction (e.g.
Banker et al., 2001; Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith, 1998; Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Rigby,
2001; Sandt et al., 2001). These studies typically
find greater satisfaction with or higher perceived
performance from Balanced Scorecards than from
other measurement practices.
Other studies examine whether perceived per-
formance is associated with the ‘match’ or ‘fit’ be-
tween the importance of intangible assets to the
firm’s competitive success and the organisation’s
reliance on intangible asset measures. Abernethy
and Guthrie (1994), Chong and Chong (1997), and
Bouwens and Abernethy (2000), among others,
support the hypothesis that diverse measurement
systems have a stronger positive association 
with self-reported performance in firms following 
innovation- or differentiation-oriented strategies
(which are likely to be related to the importance of
intangible assets) than in other firms. Olson and
Slater (2002) and Hoque (2005) also find per-
ceived overall performance relative to competitors
positively associated with the extent to which the
organisation matches its use of measures in the
four Balanced Scorecard categories to its strategy
and competitive environment. These studies sup-
port the hypothesis that intangible asset measures
are not equally beneficial in all settings. Instead,
these measures appear to be more effective when
intangible assets are more important drivers of
long-term economic success.
Although most studies using perceptual outcome
measures find significant positive associations
with intangible asset measurement, a smaller sub-
set finds mixed results. In a more sophisticated
cross-sectional study, Widener (2006) develops a
structural equations model linking the importance
of human, structural, and physical capital to self-
reported financial performance through the types
of performance measures employed. She finds
only partial support for her hypothesis that various
performance measurement practices mediate the
associations between intangible assets and perceived
financial performance. In particular, Widener 
finds that human and structural capital have direct
effects on financial performance in non-manufac-
turing firms, as well as indirect effects through the
use of employee and operational measures. In
manufacturing firms, human capital has no signif-
icant effect on firm performance, structural capital
has direct and indirect effects (through employee
measures), and physical capital only has an indirect
association with performance through the use of
employee measures (even though employee capi-
tal has no significant effect). Van der Stede et al.
(2006) report that firms following quality-oriented
strategies use more objective and subjective per-
formance measures than other firms, but that only
subjective measures increase perceived perform-
ance in quality-oriented firms. Hyvonen’s (2007)
results indicate that the use of ‘contemporary’ per-
formance measures (i.e. non-financial measures,
qualitative measures, Balanced Scorecards, and
customer surveys) leads to higher perceived cus-
tomer-related performance in firms that do not fol-
low a customer-focused strategy, but not in those
following a customer-focused strategy, contradict-
ing theories that intangible asset measurement sys-
tems are more effective when intangible assets
(such as the customer asset examined in
Hyvonen’s study) are more important to organisa-
tional success.
Although studies using perceptual outcome
measures provide preliminary evidence on the
benefits from intangible asset measurement and
useful insights into some of the factors influencing









































its effectiveness, they suffer from three limitations
that are unique to this research design. First, the
same respondent typically answers questions on
both the performance measurement system and or-
ganisational outcomes. This can lead to ‘common
method bias’ (Podsakoff et al., 2003), with the
strong positive associations driven by the tenden-
cy of respondents to answer all questions in a sur-
vey in a similar manner (e.g. all high or all low) or
the possibility that perceptions about one set of
questions (such as performance) bias responses to
another (such as performance measurement prac-
tices).
Second, the perceptual outcome scales often
leave considerable room for interpretation. For ex-
ample, surveys commonly ask respondents to rate
performance relative to competitors or internal 
expectations on a scale from 1 = ‘significantly
below’ to 5 = ‘significantly above’. However, dif-
ferences in the choice of competitive peers, inter-
nal targets, or the interpretation of ‘significant’ can
lead to substantially different responses. In addi-
tion, the outcome measures often relate to unspec-
ified ‘overall’ performance or are based on
self-reported performance on multiple financial
and non-financial dimensions (with the measures
equally-weighted or weighted based on the per-
formance dimensions’ perceived importance). For
example, Hoque and James (2000) measure per-
formance (ranging from 1 = ‘below average’ to 5 =
‘above average’) using equally-weighted respons-
es to survey questions on the organisation’s per-
formance on both financial (return on investment
(ROI) and return on sales (ROS)) and non-finan-
cial dimensions (capacity utilisation, customer 
satisfaction, and quality). But these three non-fi-
nancial dimensions may not reflect the intangibles
measures used by the organisation (in fact, only
customer satisfaction performance is directly relat-
ed to the four categories of scorecard measures ex-
amined in their study) and equal weighting may
not reflect their actual (or even perceived) impor-
tance to economic value improvement.
Moreover, research indicates that improvements
in non-financial performance dimensions do not
always translate into improved economic results
(e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 2005). The lack of signif-
icant economic gains from improvements in intan-
gible asset measures can occur for a variety of
reasons, such as an ineffective strategy, poor meas-
ures, inappropriate improvement targets, gaming
of measures and targets, and organisational barri-
ers that prevent improvements from reaching the
bottom-line. As a result, a positive association be-
tween intangible asset measurement and perceived
improvements in intangible performance dimen-
sions does not necessarily imply improved eco-
nomic performance.
3.2. Cross-sectional studies using actual 
economic outcomes
An alternative cross-sectional research design
links intangible asset measurement to actual ac-
counting performance or stock returns. Studies
using actual economic results are far fewer in
number than studies using perceptual outcome
measures. Similar to Hyvonen’s (2007) results
using perceived performance, Ittner and Larcker’s
(1995) investigation of quality-oriented measure-
ment practices in automobile and computer firms
finds that greater reliance on non-traditional meas-
urement techniques (i.e. ‘bottom-up’ data gather-
ing, non-financial and team-based rewards, and
frequent reporting of quality information) is posi-
tively associated with return on assets (ROA) in
organisations making less extensive use of formal
quality improvement practices, but finds no signif-
icant association in organisations with extensive
quality management programmes. The evidence in
the Ittner and Larcker (1995) and Hyvonen (2007)
studies suggests that alternatives to formal intangi-
ble asset measurement may be available for pro-
viding the information and incentives needed to
support well-developed customer- and quality-ori-
ented strategies.
In a related study, Ittner and Larcker (1997a)
find that quality-based rewards have a significant
positive association with ROS (but not ROA) in
the computer industry, but have no significant 
effect on accounting performance in the automo-
bile industry. Taken together, the results in these
studies provide only mixed support for claims that
intangible asset measurement improves perform-
ance.
Said et al. (2003) provide stronger evidence that
the use of intangible asset measures in reward sys-
tems is associated with higher economic perform-
ance. Their study uses proxy statement disclosures
by US firms to investigate whether the use of or
weight on non-financial measures in CEO bonus
contracts is related to firm performance. They find
that firms using both financial and non-financial
measures in bonus contracts, and those placing
greater weight on non-financial measures, have
significantly higher current and future stock 
market returns, as well as higher future ROA.
Moreover, their results again indicate that the per-
formance effects from non-financial measures are
contingent on the extent to which the emphasis
placed on these measures is appropriate for the
firm’s operational and competitive characteristics.
If too much or too little emphasis is placed on 
intangible asset measures given the firm’s charac-
teristics and strategic objectives, economic per-
formance is lower.
The significant contemporaneous relations with
stock returns but not accounting returns in the Said
et al. (2003) study may indicate that the market an-









































ticipates future operating improvements from in-
tangible asset measurement, and impounds this ex-
pectation into current stock price. Ittner et al.
(2003) find similar differential effects when ac-
counting or stock returns serve as their outcome
variables. Using a sample of US financial services
firms, they examine the cross-sectional associa-
tions between several publicly-available economic
measures (ROA, sales growth, one-year stock re-
turns, and three-year stock returns) and survey-
based responses on performance measurement
practices. Unlike most studies, their survey instru-
ment incorporates a wide variety of performance
measurement uses (problem identification and ac-
tion plan development, capital investment evalua-
tion, managerial performance evaluation, and
external disclosure) and ten specific categories of
tangible and intangible ‘value driver’ measures,
rather than a general variable reflecting the relative
importance of financial and non-financial meas-
ures. They find that firms using a diverse set of
measures have higher stock returns, particularly
when measurement diversity is greater than that of
firms with similar strategies or value drivers.
ROA, on the other hand, is not statistically associ-
ated with intangible asset measurement practices,
even in the subsample of firms with more mature
measurement systems. Although Balanced
Scorecard users report higher satisfaction with
their measurement systems, ROA in scorecard
users is statistically lower and stock returns are not
statistically different than non-users, providing no
support for the claimed economic benefits from
Balanced Scorecard implementations.
One explanation for the lower ROA in the self-
proclaimed scorecard adopters examined by Ittner
et al. (2003) is that underperforming firms are
more likely to adopt measurement innovations
such as the Balanced Scorecard in the hopes of im-
proving performance, and that these adopters’ sys-
tems were not in place long enough at the time of
the study to yield economic results. However, ad-
ditional analysis does not support this conjecture.
Ittner et al. (2003) find that Balanced Scorecard
users reporting no significant changes in their
measurement systems in the past two years do not
have significantly higher economic performance
or satisfaction, suggesting that even the higher sat-
isfaction from scorecard systems may be short-
lived.
Braam and Nijssen’s (2004) examination of
Balanced Scorecard practices in Dutch firms also
finds higher perceived performance but lower ac-
counting performance when Balanced Scorecard
usage is greater. In particular, firms with ‘meas-
urement-focused’ scorecard use (defined as inten-
sive use of a comprehensive measurement system)
report statistically lower change in ROI and no 
significant difference in perceived company per-
formance, while those with ‘strategy-focused’
scorecard usage (defined as the interaction be-
tween an innovation-oriented strategy and the use
of a measurement-focused scorecard) report high-
er perceived performance but no significant differ-
ence in accounting return changes. Like Ittner et
al.’s (2003) results, this evidence raises questions
regarding the validity of studies using perceptual
outcome measures such as satisfaction or per-
ceived performance.
In sum, cross-sectional studies using actual eco-
nomic outcomes provide some evidence that intan-
gible asset measurement is associated with higher
performance, though the results tend to be weaker
than those using perceptual outcome variables
(particularly with respect to Balanced Scorecard
usage). Consistent with agency and contingency
theories, cross-sectional studies using both percep-
tual and actual outcome measures generally find
that performance is enhanced when the emphasis
on intangible asset measures is aligned with the or-
ganisation’s sources of competitive advantage.
Thus, it is unlikely that intangible asset measures
are equally valuable in all settings, and may actu-
ally be detrimental in some circumstances.
While generally supporting the claim that intan-
gible asset measurement can be beneficial, the re-
sults in all large sample, cross-sectional studies
must be approached with caution. One difficulty is
accurately assessing complex performance meas-
urement practices using a survey instrument and a
single respondent per firm, the dominant source of
data in these studies. For example, measurement
choices include not only the specific types of
measures and their relative importance, but also
the specific techniques used to measure these at-
tributes (e.g. financial or non-financial measures;
survey responses, counts, percentages, or time-
based measures; quantitative or qualitative meas-
ures; relative or absolute measures, etc.) and the
performance targets set for the measures.
Compensation plans (the most frequently exam-
ined measurement use) also have many important
attributes other than the measures in the plan (such
as the amount of pay at risk and the presence of
performance hurdles or payout caps) that are like-
ly to influence their performance effects. In some
cases, it is hard to even specify the specific attrib-
utes that distinguish a given measurement frame-
work or technique. For example, what exactly
constitutes a ‘Balanced Scorecard’, and how can a
researcher determine whether a company is using
one or not? Ittner et al. (2003), for example, find
that financial services firms that claim to use a
scorecard do not place statistically greater empha-
sis on non-financial measures and are no more
likely to have developed a ‘strategy map’ (which
Kaplan and Norton (1996) argue is a fundamental
element of a Balanced Scorecard) than those that









































do not claim to use a scorecard. Without more ex-
tensive details on firms’ measurement systems, it
is hard to conclude that the use of intangibles
measures, rather than other related measurement
or incentive system attributes, drives any observed
performance effects.
Difficulties assessing measurement practices
using a survey are compounded by the fact that
many survey-based studies do not specify the spe-
cific decision context the measures are used for
(e.g. capital investment, business performance
evaluation, problem-solving, or rewards), making
it difficult to determine whether respondents con-
sidered the same contexts when giving their an-
swers. This can be a significant problem since
theoretical studies indicate that the optimal use of
a specific performance measure for one purpose
need not be optimal for another.
Even when more targeted survey questions are
used, the ambiguity may not be resolved. Consider
a question on the organisations’ use of intangible
asset measures for evaluating managerial perform-
ance. Does greater use of intangibles measures for
managerial performance evaluation refer to termi-
nation decisions, salary increases, bonuses, pro-
motions, or some mix of the four? Campbell’s
(2008) study of a US fast food chain, for example,
finds managers’ bonuses more strongly associated
with financial measures, but promotions more
strongly associated with non-financial measures
that may be better indicators of success in subse-
quent positions. His results suggest that even a
question on the use of different measures for man-
agerial performance evaluation may yield different
answers depending upon the specific context con-
sidered by the survey respondent.
A second limitation is the potential lag between
measurement system implementation and any re-
sulting performance effects. One of the primary
reasons for measuring intangible assets is captur-
ing information on key drivers of long-term per-
formance that is not captured in current accounting
measures. However, researchers (and companies)
rarely know how long it takes (or is expected to
take) before changes in intangible asset measures
yield economic results, making it difficult to spec-
ify the appropriate lag in empirical models.
HassabElnaby et al.’s (2005) examination of com-
pensation contracts for US executives also finds
that many firms abandon the use of non-financial
measures within one to two years, which may not
be long enough to motivate mangers to optimally
choose the long-term investment level in intangi-
ble assets. If intangible asset measures are leading
indicators of firm performance, the implementa-
tion of intangible asset measurement systems may
have little short-term effect on performance.
Although Said et al. (2003) examine both current
and future performance and Ittner et al. (2003)
provide evidence on the performance effects of
more mature systems that have not been changed
significantly in the past two years, none of the pre-
ceding studies gathers data on when the systems or
measures were actually implemented.
A bigger concern is causality. Even though a sig-
nificant positive statistical association is found be-
tween intangible asset measures and performance,
it may simply reflect correlation rather than causa-
tion. As noted earlier, the choice of performance
measures is only one of many elements in per-
formance measurement systems, and it is possible
that these other elements, rather than the specific
performance measures, drive any performance dif-
ferences. Similarly, performance measurement
systems are often implemented together with other
organisational innovations, strategic changes, or
reorganisations which, if not controlled for in the
statistical model (as many studies do not do), can
lead to erroneous inferences. More broadly, per-
formance measurement systems are endogenous
choices that numerous studies have found to be as-
sociated with factors such as industry, strategy,
performance improvement techniques, regulation,
and interdependencies (e.g. Banker et al., 1993;
Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997). If the
predictor variables are endogenous choices and
their determinants are not included in the statisti-
cal model, the variables will be correlated with the
true (but unobserved) error term in the statistical
model. As a result, regression parameter estimates
will be inconsistent because of correlated omitted
variable problems. Though some of the preceding
studies make attempts to account for these issues,
causality and endogeneity remain serious concerns
that future studies must make greater effort to ad-
dress.
3.3. Quasi-experimental, company-specific studies
A small subset of researchers have traded off the
enhanced generalisability of large sample, cross-
sectional studies for the greater research control
available in quasi-experimental studies using com-
pany-specific time series data. In these studies,
performance is compared before and after the im-
plementation of the intangible asset measurement
system, with a sample of non-adopters used to fur-
ther control for time series trends and other com-
mon factors that potentially influence performance
in all of the units but are unrelated to the new sys-
tems (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Banker et al.
(2000), for example, examine the implementation
of an incentive system containing non-financial
measures in a US hotel chain. In addition to con-
trolling for a number of location-specific demo-
graphic factors that are likely to influence hotel
performance, the authors use franchisees of the
hotel chain (which did not implement the new sys-
tem) to control for other factors that may impact









































on all members of the chain (e.g. advertising cam-
paigns or economic changes). They find statisti-
cally significant improvements in both customer
satisfaction and financial performance in adopters
of the new system, with their many controls pro-
viding greater confidence that the gains were driv-
en by the new incentive system.
Davis and Albright (2004) use a similar research
design to investigate whether branches of a
Canadian bank that implemented a Balanced
Scorecard achieved higher financial performance
than branches in the same bank that did not imple-
ment such a system, with the adopters and non-
adopters representing distinct geographic regions.
Although financial performance was similar in the
two sets of branches prior to the scorecard imple-
mentation, the adopters achieved significantly
higher financial performance after implementing
scorecards. Surprisingly, the performance gains
were achieved within one month of the scorecard
implementation date and did not increase further in
subsequent months – surprising because the non-
financial measures in Balanced Scorecards are
claimed to overcome the overly short-term focus
of financial measures in traditional performance
measurement systems. If improvements in the
non-financial Balanced Scorecard measures lead
to financial performance improvements in one
month, the need for these measures to overcome
the (perceived) short-term bias in financial per-
formance measures is unclear since any improve-
ments in non-financial measures are reflected in
financial measures on an almost contemporaneous
basis, defeating the need for leading indicators.
However, since the adopting and non-adopting
branches were not matched on important factors
such as size, location, and customer base (and the
authors do not control for these factors in their sta-
tistical tests), and because the paper does not re-
port whether improvements in the financial
measures (which were also used in the previous
measurement system) were associated with
changes in the new non-financial scorecard meas-
ures, it is hard to conclude that the gains were due
to intangible asset measurement rather than to a
‘Hawthorne Effect’ from increased emphasis on a
new performance measurement system.
In contrast to the positive results reported by
Banker et al. (2000) and Davis and Albright (2004),
quasi-experimental studies by Neely (2007) and
Griffith and Neely (2007) reach conflicting con-
clusions regarding the benefits from Balanced
Scorecard systems. Neely (2007) uses data from
two sister divisions of a UK wholesale electronics
chain, one of which implemented a scorecard and
one which did not. Although the implementing di-
vision achieved improvements in sales and profits,
statistically similar improvements are also found
in a geographically matched set of stores in the sis-
ter division, providing no support for the perform-
ance benefits from the Balanced Scorecard.
Griffith and Neely’s (2007) results are mixed.
Their sample consists of branches belonging to
two UK divisions of a heating and plumbing dis-
tributor. One division implemented a new incen-
tive plan using the Balanced Scorecard and the
other retained the existing profit-based plan. After
matching on postal code and controlling for other
factors expected to result in differences in division
performance (due to one division focusing on
commercial customers and the other focusing 
on retail customers), they find that the Balanced
Scorecard did not increase profits in all imple-
menting branches. Instead, costs increased faster
than sales in some of the implementing units.
However, the Balanced Scorecard appears to have
had a favourable effect in branches with more ex-
perienced managers, indicating that different deci-
sion-makers are not equally prepared to take
advantage of the extra information provided in
scorecard systems.
Although existing small sample, quasi-experi-
mental studies are few in number, may not gener-
alise to broader samples, focus exclusively on
incentive plans, and provide only mixed support
for claims that intangible asset measurement im-
proves performance, they offer some of the most
powerful tests of the claimed benefits from intan-
gible asset measurement and highlight some of the
implementation problems associated with these
measures. Similar studies can greatly improve our
understanding of intangible asset measurement
and its implications.
3.4. Intangible asset measurement and causal
business models
Recent work on intangible asset measurement
increasingly argues that a key element of effective
measurement systems is the development of ex-
plicit ‘causal business models’ or ‘strategy maps’.
Causal business models represent the hypothesised
cause-and-effect relations between investments in
intangible assets and economic performance, as
expressed or assumed in the company’s strategic
plan. Proponents of causal business modelling
claim that the explicit development of these mod-
els forces organisations to answer the question,
‘How are intangible assets supposed to improve
our firm’s financial performance?’. By providing
managers with the company’s expectations regard-
ing the links between improvements in intangible
assets and economic results, explicit causal busi-
ness models are claimed to improve communica-
tion of strategic goals, increase the focus on
intangible assets, improve performance measure
choices and decision-making, and enhance per-
formance evaluation (e.g. Kaplan and Norton, 2004;
Marr et al., 2004). However, the use of causal busi-









































ness models is not universally embraced. Norreklit
(2000, 2003), for example, questions the cause-
and-effect relations among the four Balanced
Scorecard perspectives, as well as the top-down
control model embedded in the modelling process.
Consistent with the claimed benefits from ex-
plicit causal business models, experimental studies
show that providing causal models to employees
can reduce the over-emphasis on short-term finan-
cial measures in performance evaluations (Banker
et al., 2004), enhance accountants’ evaluation of
benchmark data that require the assessment of
cause-and-effect relations (Vera-Munoz et al.,
2007), and reduce conflicts between supervisors
and subordinates in Balanced Scorecard evalua-
tions (Wong-On-Wing et al., 2007).
Survey-based studies also provide preliminary
evidence that the provision of causal business
models can be beneficial. Banker et al.’s (2007)
survey of US Chief Financial Officers finds
greater satisfaction with performance measure-
ment systems that enable employees to understand
organisational linkages, while Chenhall’s (2005)
survey of Australian firms indicates that integra-
tive performance measurement systems that artic-
ulate strategic and operational linkages are
positively associated with perceived organisation-
al learning. In Ittner and Larcker’s (2003) survey
of a diverse set of US firms, those reporting that
they consistently build and verify causal business
models have significantly higher publicly-reported
ROA and ROE than those that do not. In a second
study of US financial services firms (Ittner et al.,
2003), respondents claiming to rely extensively on
formal business models report statistically higher
perceived measurement system satisfaction and
achieve higher publicly-reported ROA, but busi-
ness models are not significantly associated with
publicly-reported sales growth or stock returns.
Although these studies suggest that explicit
causal business models provide potential advan-
tages, surveys indicate that most firms have not
developed formal causal models, and those that do
frequently do not test whether the hypothesised
linkages actually hold in practice. Ittner and
Larcker (2003), for example, report that only 30%
of their sample develop formal causal models, and
only 23% attempt to verify the causal links. Nearly
30% of the firms they surveyed place no reliance
on a formal business model, and only 35% make
substantial to complete use.
Small sample studies suggest that the failure to
develop and validate causal business models may
be one reason why some firms find it difficult to
link improvements in intangible assets to econom-
ic performance. Campbell et al. (2006) examine a
Balanced Scorecard implementation in a US con-
venience store chain and find that causal analysis
of the data in the scorecard could have been used
to identify strategic problems and highlight im-
provement opportunities, particularly with respect
to employee capabilities. However, the chain did
not perform this analysis, which the authors claim
could have prevented the failure of the firm’s strat-
egy. Ittner and Larcker (2003, 2005) analyse the
causal models in a wide variety of manufacturing
and service firms and conclude that management
intuition regarding causal models is often incom-
plete or inaccurate, leading managers to chase
strategies and metrics that may be inappropriate.
Malina et al.’s (2007) examination of a large US
company’s scorecard, on the other hand, finds lit-
tle or no statistically significant relation between
the linked performance measures in the company’s
causal model, yet the company expressed satisfac-
tion with the system and firm profitability. The au-
thors conclude that an effective management
control system does not require statistically signif-
icant cause-and-effect relations when other factors
create a strong climate of control.
Taken together, the limited existing evidence on
causal business modelling suggests that this prac-
tice may be beneficial in some settings, but may
not be a necessary condition for effectively linking
intangible assets to economic performance. Future
research can make a significant contribution by ex-
amining the conditions under which explicit causal
models contribute to performance gains, and the
specific practices for developing and validating
causal models that are most effective.
3.5. Implementation issues
One important set of factors missing in most per-
formance tests are implementation issues.
Qualitative studies have identified a wide variety
of implementation issues that potentially influence
performance measurement outcomes (see Bourne
et al. (2003) and Franco-Santos and Bourne (2005)
for reviews). These issues can be broadly classi-
fied into technical and organisational factors.
Technical factors include issues such as the
choice and weighting of measures, target setting,
and information system capabilities. Even if an in-
tangible asset category is important, important de-
cisions must still be made regarding the specific
measures and measurement methodologies for that
category. Dozens of potential measures are avail-
able for any intangible asset dimension, and or-
ganisations must decide which of these measures
to incorporate in their measurement systems. Yet
empirical studies find that different methods for
measuring the same dimension can have a signifi-
cantly different ability to explain economic per-
formance (e.g. Ryan et al., 1995; Sedatole, 2003),
making the decision regarding the specific meas-
ures to use far from straight-forward. In addition,
Hemmer’s (1996) model shows how differences in
the measurement of non-financial performance di-









































mensions (e.g. the use of numbers vs. ratios for
measuring customer satisfaction) can influence the
measures’ incentive effects. Difficulties determin-
ing the appropriate measures and methodologies
can be even greater for intangible asset dimensions
that are more qualitative in nature (Cavalluzzo and
Ittner, 2004). This evidence suggests that the spe-
cific measures and measurement methodologies
used by the organisation, rather than the simple
measurement of intangible asset categories, have
the greatest influence on economic performance.
Another important issue is setting targets for the
measures. Research suggests that the relation be-
tween intangible asset measures and financial re-
sults is often non-linear, with diminishing or
negative returns at higher intangibles levels (e.g.
Ittner and Larcker, 1997b, 2005). For example,
100% satisfied employees and customers or max-
imising the number of patents are unlikely to be
optimal in most companies. However, Ittner and
Larcker (2003, 2005) find that many (if not most)
companies make little or no attempt to determine
the appropriate targets for intangible asset meas-
ures. Unless some attempt is made to determine
the point of diminishing or negative returns, com-
panies may be investing too much in improving in-
tangible asset measures.
Other target-setting difficulties arise when dif-
ferent performance objectives conflict in the short-
term. For example, investments in many intangible
asset dimensions, such as research and develop-
ment or brand building, can reduce short-term ac-
counting performance due to expensing rules, but
generally do not improve economic performance
for some time. When the lags between improve-
ments in intangible asset measures and economic
performance are unclear, companies find it hard to
set appropriate short-term goals for the conflicting
performance dimensions (e.g. Gates, 1999).
In addition, despite the growth in computer ca-
pabilities and integrated software programs, many
firms still face problems getting their disparate
systems to provide timely performance measures
in a consistent format that facilitates performance
evaluation and data analysis, due to factors such as
inconsistent identifiers, units of analysis, and tim-
ing of measurement in various databases (Bourne
et al., 2003; Ittner and Larcker, 2003; Jiang et al.,
2007). Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) find that data
limitations do not influence the implementation of
performance measurement innovations, but limit
the self-reported use of the resulting information
for accountability and decision-making purposes.
Organisational barriers may be even harder to
overcome than technical barriers. One significant
organisational barrier is the internal politics of per-
formance measurement choice and use. As
Waggoner et al.’s (1999) inter-disciplinary review
of the performance measurement literature notes,
performance measures have a powerful effect on
power distributions within organisations. As a re-
sult, organisational participants may resist changes
in existing ‘rules of the game’ (such as the intro-
duction of intangible asset measures) or fight for
the introduction of measures that reflect their ac-
tivities in a more favourable light. In many cases,
power issues lead to an ever-increasing growth in
intangible asset measures as managers push their
own measures to ensure that their efforts are
recognised and rewarded (Ittner and Larcker,
2003). Organisational disputes over who ‘owns’
different measures (or ‘data fiefdoms’) can also
hamper the exchange of data across functions and
hinder the company’s ability to assess linkages
among measures, limiting their effectiveness. If
the choice and use of intangible asset measures re-
flect internal politics more than the development
of leading indicators of firm performance, per-
formance tests will be unlikely to detect any eco-
nomic benefits from intangible asset measurement.
Finally, the influence of intangibles measure-
ment on economic performance is likely to be in-
fluenced by management’s commitment to the
measures’ use. Top management support can en-
sure adequate resources are made available for im-
plementation and ongoing data analysis, can focus
organisational attention on the measures, and can
prevent short-term financial concerns from domi-
nating decision-making and performance evalua-
tions (Franco-Santos and Bourne, 2005).
As the implementation literature highlights,
even if the use of reliable and valid intangible asset
measures offers economic benefits in a given set-
ting, technical and organisational barriers can limit
these benefits, reducing a researcher’s ability to
identify performance gains if these issues are not
incorporated into the research design and statisti-
cal models.
4. Conclusions and issues for future 
research
The evidence reviewed in this paper identifies some
of the difficulties in assessing whether or when in-
ternal measurement of intangible assets improves
economic performance. Although the bulk of stud-
ies provide at least some evidence that intangible
asset measurement is associated with higher per-
formance, many are limited by over-reliance on
perceptual satisfaction or outcome variables, inad-
equate controls for contingency factors, simple
variables for capturing complex measurement
practices, and the lack of data on implementation
practices. Future studies must take account of
these research design issues if our understanding
of the performance benefits from intangible asset
measurement is to improve.
In addition, opportunities exist to extend research
on the links between intangible asset measurement









































and economic outcomes. First, researchers can ex-
amine whether the effects of financial or valua-
tion-based intangible asset measures (such as
human capital accounting or brand valuation) dif-
fer from those of non-financial measures (such as
employee satisfaction, training, or turnover or
brand awareness). To date, performance studies
have not distinguished between the two types of
measures, and have tended to classify any meas-
ures that are not traditional accounting measures as
non-financial. Not only does this ignore the fact
that many intangible asset measures can be either
financial or non-financial, but also the many ad-
vances that have been made in intangible asset val-
uation (see Andriessen (2004b) for a review).
Another opportunity is examining a broader set
of intangible asset measurement uses. The vast
majority of studies examine reward and perform-
ance evaluation systems. But these measures are
also used for other purposes such as decision-mak-
ing, problem identification, and forecasting.
Moreover, some economic theories suggest that
the measures used for valuing a business need not
be useful for assessing a manager’s performance
(e.g. Gjesdal, 1981; Paul, 1992; Feltham and Xie,
1994). Consequently, restricting the analysis to
managerial performance evaluation and reward
systems is likely to provide only a partial under-
standing of firms’ measurement practices and
measurement system performance consequences.
Finally, greater use of small sample or quasi-
experimental studies is recommended. Although
the generalisability of these studies is limited to
some extent by the specific settings being exam-
ined, they offer greater opportunity to control for
confounding factors than large sample, cross-
sectional studies. More importantly, only through
intimate knowledge of research sites can the full
complexity and nuances of performance measure-
ment implementation and use be fully understood
and incorporated into the analysis and interpreta-
tion of statistical tests of performance implica-
tions.
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